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ABSTRACT
The health sector in the United States consists of various independent
provider groups. Close functional relationships exist betx^een many providers,
such as, between physicians and hospitals. However, formal economic relation-
ships between these provider groups have been almost nonexistent. This lack of
economic coordination that has been the result of various types of third party
payment mechanisms has resulted in inefficiencies in the provision of health
care. Specifically, the physician-agent has prescribed health services to the
patient while having little or no financial responsibility to the patient or
other providers.
The authors argue that efficient health care delivery requires that
payment mechanisms pass relevant financial risks to providers and consumers,
these risks will provide incentives for consumers to seek efficient providers
and for providers to deliver services efficiently.
A major source of gains in efficiency will result from the integration
of health care providers. Vertical integration, in particular, will provide
gains in technical efficiency, the reduction of contractual costs and gains
in information economics. Examples are provided of how various types of
integration will provide each of the types of gains in efficiency.

INTRODUCTION
The health care sector in the United States and in many
other countries consists of various independent provider
groups. Each group plays a highly segmented functional role
in supplying health care services to consumers. A close
functional relationship exists between many providers such
as between physicians and hospitals. Many of these
relationships are complimentary in nature and essential
elements in providing certain types of health care.
However, formal economic relationships between these
provider groups, from limited contractual, contractual, to
full integration through common ownership, have been almost
nonexistent.
Various inefficiencies in providing total health care
services have resulted from this lack of coordination and
integration. These inefficiencies take many forms including
overlapping responsibility, unnecessary duplication of
facilities, unnecessary tests and services, misplacement of
needed care, use of inefficient facilities, excess capacity,
and limited quality control. In reality, these inputs are
only intermediate factors used to promote improved health
status. The ultimate well-being of the individual is the
goal. Structural inefficiency exists when the disharmony
occurs between means (inputs) and goals (health status).
Inefficiencies caused by an uncoordinated production
and distribution system of health care services exist in
both decentralized economies such as the United States
(Arnould and Van Vorst, forthcoming) and highly centralized
economies such as Israel (Palley, Yishai and Ever-Hadani,
1303) .
The most impelling cause of production and consumption
inefficiencies in the United States has been the
availability of public (Medicare and Medicaid) and private
(Blue Cross/Blue Shield) insurance systems that transfer the
financial risk associated with providing health care
services to third parry payors. The third party
reimbursement system promoted the "codification" of the
independent roles of provider groups. Providers of
individual services were not linked in any economic manner
with one another when rendering services to the same
patient. No financial incentive to coordinate or include
services existed. Communication among providers on basic
patient-care related data was not formally established as an
operating norm.
The federal government's policy statement of health
care as a basic human right implied financial constraints
that were not controlling. This philosophical approach of
government, the larcest individual purchaser cf health care
services, was consistent with the prevalent Judeo-Christian
ethic in the United States of the sanctity and value of an
individual life.
Thus, our health care system was built on a model with
limited incentives for efficient resource utilization. The
cumulative result was a rapid escalation of total
expenditures for health care services in the United States.
In 1965, $41.7 billion or 6% of GNP was spent on health care
in the United States. These costs had risen to $321.4
billion, or 10.2% of GNP in 1982. Total health care costs
are expected to increase to over $462 billion by 1935 (U.S.
Dept. HHS , various years) . Clearly, some of this increase is
the result of improved technology and changing demographic
characteristics of the U.S. population. However, a
significant component of these increased expenditures can be
attributed to inefficiencies in the demand for and the
supply of health care services.
This rapid increase in health care costs, coupled with
major changes in the nation's economy, has caused a
re-evaluation of the basic philosophical goals of health
care and significant, changes in the insurance systems in the
private and public sectors. Both sectors have adopted mere
market-oriented approaches that shift part of the financial
risk to providers and consumers. These changes will result
in a substantial re-evaluation of the traditional roles,
structures, and responsibilities of providers. Various
forms of provider integration have begun, with more changes
emerging rapidly. These changes will bring more commonality
in the incentives of various provider groups. This is a
recent and emerging phenomenon. Therefore, our discussion
will provide a theoretical basis for health care provider
integration, a documentation of certain types of
ir -egration, and an assessment of certain gains in
efficiency. Potential forms of integration depend upon the
degree of efficiencies associated with various "linking"
arrangements among providers. These efficiencies are
difficult to measure and, therefore, long-run
experimentation with different market forms will be
necessary to test the ultimate gains through expanded
provider integration.
This paper is divided into three sections. The next
section describes the nature of production and consumption
cf health care services and identifies six groups of
participants in these activities. The second section
describes existing contractual relations between these
participant, groups and hew changes in these relationships
are changing the agent roles of providers. The third
section describes types and sources cf efficiency from
integration
.
MATURE OF PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES
An understanding of the nature cf production and
consumption of health care services in the United States is
essential to analyze past structural inefficiencies and the
emerging role of provider integration. There are six broad
groupings of participants that interact to provide health
care services: government, consumers, insurers, first level
providers , second level providers and third level providers.
1. Government exerts authority over the health care
ystem at all levels in societv. The federal government has
greatly expanded its activities as a purchaser of health
care services through the enactment of Medicare and
Medicaid. Cooperative planning efforts during the 1960 ' s
were strengthened in the 19 70 's through the passage of U.S.
Government lav/ PL 9 3-641 and the subsequent development of
state Certificate of Need (CON) activities.
Tax treatment of health insurance premiums in the
United States has eliminated the normal income effect of
higher insurance prices on consumers and, thus, the
incentive for the insurer to function as the efficiency
control mechanism. Other government actions have bred a
similar lack of efficiency incentives. Selective cost
controls resulted in costs being transferred from regulated
inputs to unregulated inputs, and from publicly reimbursed
patients to privately insured patients. Subsidies to expand
the number of physicians and hospital beds without controls
on demand resulted in supply created demand.
The professions have used self-regulation to restrict
infringement in their production areas by different types of
cost-effective suppliers (Havighurst and King, 1983). Other
forms of regulation (Sloan and Steinvaid, 1980; Arnculd and
Van Vorst, forthcoming) have promoted the divergent
interests of various input providers.
As long as purchasers' budgets expanded, health care
service providers had no incentive to integrate to become
more efficient. In the last decade attention has focused
en the rapidly increasing resources being devoted to health
care. Employee health care costs were a factor in causing
U.S. firms to lose their competitive edge in world markets.
Rapidly escalating costs of government programs placed great
strains en the federal budget. The aging U.S. population is
increasing the number of people in the high medical cost
category. The rapid increase in high-cost, technological
life-improving developments further increased costs. Without
changes in government policies, costs in this sector will
continue to strain the economy.
The government established methods to control resource
expenditures in health care. Professional Standards Review
Organizations (PSP.O) , created to provide external review of
procedures prescribed by physicians, have failed to control
the elements under their jurisdiction, namely the types and
units of services provided (Sloan and Steinwald, 1980).
This failure is due in part to PSRO's having no authority
over costs per unit of service.
Certificate cf Need laws, established to reduce excess
capacity by limiting the availability of services, have not
effectively controlled costs. Finally, evidence shows that
selective controls on certain inputs have controlled those
inputs, but have resulted in higher overall costs because
costs were shifted to other inputs. Thus, government
actions have failed to negate the perverse effects of
incentives generated by third party payment mechanisms.
2. Consumers are individuals who utilize health care
services. There are twe unique characteristics about the
production of health care services. First, the consumer
provides substantial input into the production process in
the form of information before the other inputs are
prescribed (Arnouid, 1972). This vertical interaction gives
the physician information about the patients ' s health status
and psychological state. Second, from this information the
physician acts as an agent and prescribes the ether inputs
necessary to provide the desired health outcome (Arrow,
1963; Evans, 1983). Consumer knowledge of health care
production is generally limited. The consumer may be able
tc identify symptoms, but is usually unable to diagnose the
cause or draw together apprcpriate inputs tc produce a
desired result. The physician-agent determines what tests
are needed, whether the problem can be treated with drugs or
surgery, whether hospitalization is necessary and for how
long, and whether specialists are required.
Typically agency relationships occur in single economic
units where owners and managers have different objectives
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Also, these relationships
occur in markets where competition places seme, if not
ultimate, control over deviations of firm behavior from cost
minimization and profit maximization. The agent
relationship in health care encompasses two economic units -
the consumer and one of the provider units. Evans (1983)
argues that this is incomplete vertical integration because
the relationship dees not encompass economic or contractual
relationships between the physician-agent and the consumer
cr other input" providers. Therefore, the agent-physician
bears no financial risk for other inputs prescribed and has
no financial responsibility to the consumer. Finally, the
behavior of governments and insurers has removed competitive
market forces that would place controls on the extent the
agency behavior deviates from cost minimization behavior.
3 . Third Parry Payors provide the financing and
insuring of health care services for various consumer
groups. Third party payors consist of various government
units, private insurers and self-insured employers. Over
40% of all U.S. health care expenditures were purchased by
federal and state governments, largely for Medicare and
Medicaid recipients. Similarly, Blue Cross/Blue Shield
plans, which vary across states, accounted for about half of
the private health insurance in force in the United States
in the late I970's. Thus, there has been a substantial
amount of concentration in the insurance and third party
markets
.
Various forms cf cost-plus pricing have been common in
private and government insurance contracts. Prices have
been retrospectively determined and based on fee—for-service
pricing in which the results are actual costs plus a
mark-up. To be efficient, cost-plus pricing requires the
third party payor to control the cost of a unit cf service
and the number of units of each service provided. The
contracts failed in both demands, resulting in a significant
degree of moral hazard. Output limits were not clearly
delineated in insurance contracts. External cost monitoring
such as by PSRO's, has been costly and oftentimes was dene
with incomplete information. The external monitors v/ere not
provided with tools to influence the incentives of
providers. Thus, inefficient amounts of services were
provided. Private and government third party payors have
had the authority to audit the costs of providers. However,
auditors usually had no independent method to determine true
minimum cost levels. Thus, they resorted to comparing the
cost of individual cases to industry-wide norms. Since no
providers had incentives to minimize costs, the industry
cost norms were based on inflated costs and units of
service. Thus, costs per units may have been too high.
Prices paid for some services may have been set at
artificially high levels for an additional reason. Many
major private insurers have been controlled or significantly
influenced by providers who control the reimbursement
policies of those plans, but have no risk of plan default.
Providers have used their control of plans to establish
input prices and coverage levels that ultimately resulted
in excess insurance coverage (Feldstein, 1973; Freeh and
Ginsburg, 1978), excessive and inefficient services being
provided (Goldberg and Greenberg, 1977) and higher input
costs, particularly physician fees (Arnould and DeBrcck,
forthcoming) . An efficient market in which providers bear
some financial default risks will force insurers to control
utilization and price services competitively. Insurers and
providers unwilling to do so will find their prices ^c
consumers increase and their marker shares decline.
4. First Level Providers typically have initial agency
relationship with the consumer. These providers are
physicians usually in the primary care specialties of Family
Practice, General Internal Medicine, Pediatrics and
Obstetrics. There are approximately 202,117 licensed
primary care physicians in the United States, over 148,655
of whom operate out of a solo practice model. First le ,Tel
providers have traditionally been the entree of the patient
into the health care system and in earlier times represented
the bulk of services available to the populace. The growth
of specialization aided by tremendous gams in technology
has changed the historical role of the primary care
provider. Competition in health care markets and the
development of prepaid and prospectively determined
reimburement methods is increasing the importance of primary
care prcdivers in controlling utilization and developing
these providers into a more formalized "gate-keeper" role.
5. Second level Providers provide services which are
utilized by the consumer under the direction of first level
providers or as intermediate products to first level or
other second level providers. Second level providers
include the physician specialists, who, like level one
physicians, are organized primarily as single practice
providers. They number 299,841 and play an important role
in bringing information/ technology advances to medicine.
The largest expenditure of health care dollars for
level two providers coes for hospital services. The
hospital's relationship is with both level one and two
physician-providers although this relationship normally does
nor contain an economic link or output control mechanism.
Traditional contractual relationships between health
care providers were between the hospital and physician
inputs in the form of practice privileges. These
relationships United the types of practice and procedures
of physicians, but placed no limit on the output of either
the hospital or physician. Direct agency relationships do
exist in hospitals that are owned or controlled by
physicians. Pauiy and Redisch (.1973) aroue thar. physician
control of hospitals results in the latter being operated as
physician cooperatives ana the agency role of the physicians
induces the hospitals to operate according to policies that
maximize physicians' incomes.
Other level two providers supply services for patient
care as the hospital does, generally in an indirect role;
these services are consumed upon prescription by the
physician-agent, not purchased directly by the consumer.
These providers include, but are not limited to:
Specialty inpatient hospitals including
psychiatric, rehabilitation, alcohol/ substance
abuse , etc
.
Extended inpatient care including skilled
nursing, intermediate care, swing bed
programs, etc.
*Outpatier.t clinics
Emergency response systems
Psychosocial counseling
*Adult day care
*Day hospital
*Cardiac rehabilitation programs
Outreach services including screening
clinics, emergency centers and mobile
diagnostic facilities
6. Third Level Providers typically are utilized
directly by the consumer ;;ith minimal input from levels one
and two, particularly physician-providers. Third level
prcvideres supply a broad range of services designed to meet
general health problems with a social focus en the
individual as a member of society. Third level providers
include, but are not limited to:
Housing services including senior citizen
apartments, assisted living, foster care and
life care communities
Home health services including Medicare
certified and private in-home services,
hospice, homemaker services and home infusion
therapies
Durable medical equipment including beds, walkers,
oxygen equipment and related supplies
The six broad groupings outlined above provide a
conceptual model of the various health care production
entities. These definitions are not precise or limited.
Dual roles are played between provider levels and other
entities described. The pluralism of our current health
care system and the lack of economic integration and
coordination among its various components are evident.
This non-economically integrated system lacks a central
unifying authority responsible for the efficient
coordination of the various inputs. The physician-agent
with a responsibility to the patient's health has no
contractual obligation to see that these needs are met
efficiently. Each unit prices and prescribes inputs to
maximize its own utility function. Often that maximization
process involves duplication of tests and other services
such as information gathering and the unnecessary
prescription of certain services, e.g., hospital admissions
and extra days of care. Clearly, either integration will
not cause increased efficiency or certain characteristics of
health care markets have eliminated incentives for mere
efficient production. Strong evidence suggests that the
latter is the appropriate conclusion.
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR
Contractual relations between consumers, third party
payors and providers have been poorly defined and often
open-ended. Consumers contract with third party payors to
finance the purchase of health care services from providers.
The U.S. tax laws eliminate most concerns that consumers
might have about increases in premiums in these contracts
from year to year. Cn the other end of these relationships,
the contracts between third party payors and providers have
been very incomplete.
A complete contract must specify the prices, quantities
and quality of the services to be provided. Contractual
relations between third party payors and providers have been
incomplete in all three categories. Providers have been
reimbursed on the basis cf retrospectively determined
cost-plus prices for each individual unit of service
provided. The cosrs were not necessarily minimum costs, and
the prices may have been administered by provider influence
over the third parties. Also, difficulties in specifying in
the contract the number of. units of each service necessary
tc treat a specific ailment, e.g., blood transfusions, days
in hospital, and level of nurse care, have left the quantity
dimension of the contract virtually open-ended. Finally,
quality has been specified only loosely in terms of very
general standards. These relationships are summarized in
Figure 1
.
The incompleteness of the consumer-third party and
third party-provider contracts has permitted the
physician-agent tc pass on ail financial risks to the third
party, thereby generating the potential for a significant
amount of moral hazard.
Purchasers of health care services in search of more
efficient market-oriented health care systems are changing
these contracts, especially those between third party payors
and providers to close some of the open-endedness and shift
financial risks to providers. The three nost prominent
types of contractual relationships developing in the United
States are Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO's), the
complete prepaid health plans; Prospective Payment Systems
(PPS) , where prices are based on an episode of a specific
health problem rather than each unit of service provided;
and Preferred Provider Arrangements (PPA) , featuring direct
purchase negotiations with providers. Each plan closes
various loopholes in the previous contractual arrangements.
HMO's provide the most complete shift of risk from
third party payers to providers. Purchasers of health care
services (governments or private entities) contract with one
source to provide all health care needs of a consumer group
for a predetermined premium. This inclusive premium will be
competitively determined if the HMO's must compete with
other prepaid plans and health care provision systems for
the contract. Further, most moral hazard will be eliminated
because providers' revenues are fixed for the duration of
the coverage period, usually one year. Thus, their incomes
are maximized only if their costs are minimized.
Prospective Payment Systems (PPS) and Preferred
Provider Arrangements (PPA) involve contractual arrangements
between third party payors and providers in which prices for
services are determined prospectively. However, the
dimensions of the units of services provided are defined
differently among these contracts.
The most prominent PPS in the United States is the DRG
system used to reimburse hospitals for services provided to
Medicare recipients. Currently that system delineates units
of health care services in terms of 468 diagnosis related
groups (DRG's), each of which represents an illness or
health problem. Hospital reimbursement for each DRG is
based on secondary diagnosis, patient age, and sex in
addition to the primary diagnosis. Physician, ancillary and
outpatient services and hospital capital costs currently are
not included in the system. If the hospital's cost of
providing the services is less than the predetermined
prices, the hospital keeps the surplus; if the costs are
greater, the hospital suffers the loss. This svsrem
encourages hospitals to treat patients efficiently and to
minimize ancillary service charges and lengths of stay. The
system provides an incentive to close the price and quantity
loopholes in fee-for-service contracts for each DRG treated.
However, there is no incentive to reduce admissions and may-
be an incentive to use more highly reimbursed DRG's when
secondary diagnoses offer an option.
PPA's involve direct negotiation between providers and
payors. Typically, a third party payor, insurer, or
employer will negotiate daily hospital rates, physician
charges, etc., with each provider (Trauner, 1983) . The PPA
usually provides price discounts in return for guaranteed
business. This arrangement is particularly attractive to
providers in markets plagued with excess supply. Supplier
incentives for increased efficiency result as various
suppliers in a market compete by reducing prices.
PPA's provide appropriate contractual controls on
prices and units of specific services used to produce each
of the priced services efficiently. However, these
contractual arrangements do nor control the number of units
supplied of each priced service. If hospitalization is
priced on a per diem rate, the hospital will produce each
day of care efficiently price will be determined
efficiently, bur the hospital has no incentive to reduce
admissions or lengths of stay. Thus, one dimension of the
contract remains incompletely specified as in the case of
FPS ' s . None of these contractual systems provides for more
complete control of the quality dimension than was available
with the retrospectively priced fee-for-service system.
Less substantial changes have been made in the
contractual arrangements between consumers and third party
payors. The lack of an income effect and the low marginal
ccsr of services provide only limited incentives for
consumers to seek efficient prcviders. The tax treatment of
premiums has not changed. Studies have found that
co-payments and deductibles which increase the marginal ccsr
of medical services to the consumer, also reduce the units
of health services consumed.
Recent work by the Rand Corporation has overcome these
shortcomings with controlled experiments. The Rand group
(Newhcuse, 1978; Phelps, 1982; and Phelps and Newhouse,
1972) found that 25* and 50% co-payments reduced average
total ambulatory and hospital expenditures by 19% and 30%,
respectively. Similarly, an income-related deductible and a
flat $150 deductible that applied only to ambulatory care
reduced average total expenditures by 31% and 23%,
respectively. In all cases, the reductions in expenditures
for ambulatory care were greater than those for hospital
care. Contrary to earlier beliefs, reductions in
expenditures for hospital care were significant, and related
mainly to reductions in admissions. The study reported no
differences in cost per hospital admission.
Phelps (1982) argues that additional forms of cost
sharing that would reduce health care expenditures include
limiting the tax deductibility of employer health insurance
contributions and including those premiums as taxable income-
to the employee. Phelps estimates that taxing half the
private insurance premiums would reduce health care
expenditures by 312-513 billion. Of this reduction,
expenditures for services provided by hospitals and
physicians would decline by $7.6 and $3.3 billion,
respectively
.
These cost-sharing devices have a direct influence on
providers. As consumers reduce their expenditures for
health care, there is more competition among providers for
health care dollars. Consumers seek the most efficient
health care providers.
CHANGES III CONTRACTUAL CONDITIONS CHANGS AGENT ROLES
The major effect of the changes in contractual
relationships between consumers, third party payors and
providers, discussed in the previous section, is an
alteration in the "agent-coordinator" role. The
physician-agent has been in this role in the past but, as
stated earlier, assumed little or no responsibility for the
economic efficiency of his own production process or that of
the providers of other medical services prescribed.
Eliminating some or ail shortcomings in previous contracts
shifts financial risks to the agent-coordinator, placing
economic constraints on the unit fulfilling that role
(Evans, 1983). The physician may maintain the agency role
of prescribing medical services purchased from the various
provider levels to consumers. But the agent-coordinatcr
role responsible for minimizing costs may be shifted by
varying degrees to other units. A description of various
models of contractual relations between third party payors
and providers indicates how financial risks are shifted from
third party payors to different provider levels, each having
different effects or. the traditional physician-agent role.
These models are summarized in Figure 2.
In the first model, an independent third party payor
contracts with each provider type - physicians, hospitals,
skilled nursing facilities (SNF's), etc. In this example,
we assume that these contracts pay each provider a
capitation rate based en the number of consumers entitled to
services. If the capitation rates are competitively
determined, each provider must maximize production
efficiency to maximize economic surplus. In this model, the
third party payor assumes the overall agent-coordinator
role. The physician agent may continue to prescribe units of
his own medical services and those provided by other
provider levels, but is constrained by the agent-coordinator
to prescribe them from specified providers.
In the second model, the third party provider is
integrated with level one physicians. In the United States,
physician group practices often form HMO's. This model
combines the agent-ccordinator role with the physician-agent
role. The physician-agents continue to prescribe medical
services supplied by other provider levels. However, unlike
the previous model wherein an independent third party payor
selected the other level providers , the physician-agent does
so under economic cost constraints. This model provides the
physician-agent with some direct controls over the quality
of other providers.
In the third model, the third party payor is fully
integrated downstream with all provider levels. All
contracting with external provider levels is eliminated
because these providers are under common ownership. The
physician-agent role continues to be held by level one
physicians, but the aaent-cocrdinatcr role is fulfilled by
the system or ur.it as a whole. Each provider level has some
influence over the decisions of the overall
agent-coordinator, but is now responsible for its own
provider function as well as for the efficiency of the unit
as a whole. Unlike the second model wherein the
physician-agents controlled the choice of other providers,
in this model ail providers have some authority over the
choice of all other providers. This model also gives each
provider internal control over the quality of all other
providers
.
These three models provide a limited sample of various
relationships that are emerging from the changes in
contractual relationships between consumers, third party
payors and providers. Many ether levels of integrarion
between the first and third models are possible. Providers
at any provider level could increase efficiency by
integrating upstream, downstream, or horizontally with other
providers. For example, hospitals that have signed a
capitation agreement to provide services to a group of
consumers could increase efficiency by integrating
downstream with SNF and heme health care providers or
upstream with physicians.
In the next section, we will define various types of
integration and discuss sources of gains in efficiency from
a limited number of specific types of integration. However,
the nature and extent of integration depends on the extent
to which the traditicnaJ contractual conditions can be
changed to shift financial risks to providers. It is this
shift that will incorporate economic constraints in the
agent role and induce incentives for efficiency among
providers
.
TYPES AND SOURCES OF EFFICIENCY FROM INTEGRATION
In this section, we assume that changes in the economic
system responsible for providing health care, whether that
system is characterized by highly centralized planning or
decentralized decision making, have been instituted that
place economic constraints en consumers and health care
service producers. These constraints require consumers to
seek efficient producers. Various types and levels of
producer integration may increase production efficiency.
This section defines these types of integration and sources
of gains in efficiency and describe specific examples of
integration taking place in the United States.
Types Of Integration
Integration of provider units is occurring through
horizontal, vertical and producer geographic market
extension forms of growth. It is also occurring in various
levels of completeness from short-term contracting between
providers to complete ownership. Even though we describe
all types of integration in this section, we will
concentrate on vertical integration among health care
providers wherein one provider type owns a provider in
another staae of the production process.
Long-standing structural changes have generally
involved horizontal growth of existing firms, i.e.,
expansion within generally homogeneous lines of business in
the same geographic service area. These organizations
achieve increased production efficiencies through economies
of scale. Figure 3 depicts the historical growth of
hospitals. Until recently this growth resulted from the
expansion of bed capacity and services offered within
existing general acute care hospitals. In the last decade,
there has been substantial growth in proprietary and
non-proprietary multi-hospital systems. Seme of this
expansion has been through mergers of hospitals located
within the same geographic area (horizontal groups) whereas
some his involved mergers of hospitals located in different
market areas (geographic market extension)
.
Similarly, independent physicians have grown by forming
group practices. Most of this growth has been within the
same geographic market (horizontal) . Often it has involved
combinations of physicians with differing specialties.
Generally, if these physicians are exclusively level one or
level two providers, the growth is horizontal; if they
combine level one and level two (tertiary care physicians)
,
the growth is vertical or product extension.
Provider organizations are responding to the current
health care environment by vertically integrating with other
provider types. Vertical integration occurs when a provider
expands de novo or acquires other health care input
suppliers who produce products or services that were
purchased from or sold to others prior to integration.
Examples of vertical integration include group practices or
hospitals offering HMO's, hospitals mergirg with skilled
nursing facilities, and providers self-insuring their
malpractice claims. Other examples are shown in Figure 3.
Eecause of poorly defined economic relationships between
providers, in the past these linkages have not often
involved the formal purchase or sale of services by
providers at one production level to providers at other
levels. These services were prescribed by the
physician-agent. If economic interests are placed in an
agent-coordinator, these producers, in reality, are included
in the agency relationship, organized into a vertical
production process.
These types of growth are summarized in Figure 3. A
complete compilation of each form's extent of growth is net
available. Ermann and Gabei (19S4) compiled the extension
summary of integration by multi-hospital systems shown in
the Table. The activities listed do not always fit neatly
into the traditional growth categories. Fcr example, the
expansion of hospitals into SNF ' s represents vertical growth
to the extent that patients are transferred from one unit to
the other. However, this might be considered product
extension growth to the extent that some hospital patients
do not use SNF's or vice versa. However, the activities
listed do show evidence of hospital system growth into
virtually every aspect of health care and into many
unrelated activities.
Sources of Gains in Efficiency
Each type of integration provides potential gains in
efficiency. The sources of these gains in efficiency vary
by the type of integration and the nature of exogenous
conditions in the health care provider's market. Gains in
efficiency from horizontal integration result when the firm
achieves greater economies of scale. Therefore, the cost
per unit of service produced declines as the firm expands
output. The economies of scale result from factors such as
increased specialization of functions within the provider
unit and availability of more efficient technologies at
larger scales of operation. Larger hospitals and group
practices nay be able to sub-divide various managerial
functions efficiently, allowing them to hire more qualified
administrators than is efficient for small hospitals and
independent practitioners. Similarly, larger hospitals and
group practices may be able to utilize accounting and data
information system technologies that operate efficiently at
large scales, but are not feasible en smaller scales.
Growth by geographic and product market extension
provides potential gains in efficiency due to economies of
scope. Whereas economies of scale result in expansion
within a horizontally related line of business, economies of
scope result from successfully taking advantage of joint
cost opportunities. The capital input is a common example
of a source of economies of scope. A hospital may have
access to capital at an efficient rate, but may not wish to
use that capital for horizontal expansion, e.g., because the
market may be adeauately supplied with hospital beds. That
capital may be more efficiently used to build or acquire
hospitals in other markets or purchase providers at other
levels of production, e.g., SNF, or home health care
providers. In addition to being an outlet for excess
capital funds, diversification and integration many reduce
the financial risk associated with owning the hospital's
capital instruments (stocks and/or bonds) , thereby reducing
the cost of capital to the integrated firm. Excess capacity
in the marketing or any other function within the firm may
be more efficiently utilized by expansion into other
activities that can utilize these functions. There may be
other inputs in the production of services that can be
efficiently shared by provider types within and between the
various provider levels.
Vertical integration has three potential sources of
gains in efficiency. A First, gains in technical efficiency
result from characteristics of the physical production
process. The processing of iron ore into fabricated steel
products provides an example of technical economies.
Vertically integrating processing and fabricating levels
eliminates the costs of reheating and cooling the product at
each fabrication stage. In the health care sector,
information describing a patient's health status provides a
section draws heavily from Williamson (1971)
similar example. Each provider level may need the patient's
medical record. Contracts between providers could specify
the transfer of that record between providers. However,
that contract must specify that the information be
transferred according to a common information system. It
may be costly to establish the conditions of these
contracts. Further, the contract must specify the
information's level of the quality and provide for patient
approval of the transfer of inforamrion. The difficulties
of establishing these conditions, the latter of which are
contractual costs, may make vertical integration a more
efficient alternative. Technical economies may also result
from cases in which a patient is having a procedure, e.g.,
surgery, conducted and another health-related problem is
discovered that requires use of other provider
specialists. Having direct access to those other providers
may permit multiple procedures to be conducted with
anesthesia or some other input administered only once.
Second, contractual costs provide a source of
incentives for firms to integrate vertically and to increase
efficiency. Contractual ccsts are incurred in the process
of haggling over price, quantity and quality dimensions of
the contract. Contracts providing transfer of medical
records for the patient discussed earlier describe these
ccsts. Further costs are incurred if once negotiated, the
conditions of the contract permit moral hazard.
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Third, vertical integration may result in information
economies if redevelopment of the information at various
procedure levels is eliminated. This elimnation permits the
high fixed costs associated with information gathering to be
spread over more units of output. Information economies
also may result if parties negotiating a contract disagree
on the interpretation of the information. 1 Examples of
vertical integration induced by each of these sources of
efficiency will be provided in the next section.
Examples of Various Types of Integration
A substantial amount cf integration, much of which is
vertical, is taking place among health care providers in the
United States. General patterns of integration have been
detailed in the Table. Gome types of integration
have existed long enough to provide evidence of increased
ie* rels of efficiency over non-integrated systems. Others
are less extensive and more recent. In this section, we
will describe specific cases of integration between various
provider levels shewn in Figure 2. In each case, the
sources of savings will be discussed and, where possible,
the levels of savings will be documented.
Third party pavor-first level provider integration.
Probably the most extensive and visible integration has
occurred between third party payors and various levels of
providers. In most cases, these integrated systems offer
complete coverage of the enroilees' medical needs. By
Williamson, 19 71, calls this problem "information
impactedness "
.
bringing the insurance function and the medical provider
function under common control, financial risks are shifted
to providers and, thereby, generate incentives for
efficiency. The extent: of integration ranges from including
only third party payors and level one providers, wherein
contractual relations are established for services required
from other level providers, to including almost ail provider
levels under common ownership as shewn in Models 2 and 3 in
Figure 2. The major gains in efficiency from this form of
integration result from eliminating various contractual
costs. We argued earlier that the nature of health care
makes it difficult to specify limits to the three dimensions
of contracts between third party payors and providers. The
result of open-ended contracts has been moral hazard
(Williamson, 1971)
. Integration between third party payors
ai:c level one providers induces level one providers to
minimize costs, thereby reducing moral hazard. Another
source of savings may result from eliminating the
transaction costs involved in haggling over the contract
conditions. The cost reductions from these sources will
vary with the structural relations between the third party
payment mechanism and z.he level one providers.
Integration between prepaid plans and level one
providers has taken three general structural forms, two of
which encompass forms of group practice. The staff plan
employs physicians who provide services exclusively to
HMO-plan enrollees. Staff physicians may be salaried as in
the Kaiser-Permancnte Plan or compensated in whole or in
part on a capitation rate as in Group Health Cooperative of
Puget Sound. In the closed panel structure, group practice
physicians enter into a contractual agreement to provide
services to HMO enrollees while continuing to serve
fee-for-service patients. As in the staff plan, physicians
may be salaried or paid a capitation rate. However, in some
closed panels where HMO enrollees make up a small percent of
total patients served, the individual physicians are paid on
a fee-for-service basis, although the panel is paid by a
capitation method.
In the third structure, independent practice
associations (IPA's) contract with independent physicians to
provide services to enrollees. The IPA, if integrated, is
owned by the independent physicians. Physicians may bill
the IPA on a fee-fcr-service basis or share the IPA revenues
en a capitation basis.
In any of these structures, the method of reimbursing
physicians has an important effect on the extent to which
incentives are changed by shifting risk to the HMO. The HMO
will have minimal effect on physician behavior if physician
salaries are based en production, i.e., number of services
provided. Alternatively, if physicians receive salaries
based on a capitation rate, costs from providing unnecessary
services are minimized.
Integration between staff or group practice physicians
and prepaid plans may have additional advantages over IPA's.
IPA's reauire that internal contracting be established
between the "insurance" function and the independent
physicians, each of whom may have different: operating costs.
These internal agreements are likely tc be more difficult to
establish than in group practices where each provider's
operating costs are shared by all group members. Also,
because the IFA involves physicians operating independent
businesses in various locations who have developed a joint
venture, it will be much more difficult to police free-rider
problems in the IPA model than in the group practice model.
Cost reduction from integration may also result from
increased incentives to keep patients well. Recall that
prepaid plans avoid the problems of specifying the coverage
limits by covering all health care needs of enroilees.
Therefore, physicians should practice more preventive
medicine, assuming preventive services are less costly to
provide than treatments for contracted health problems. Many
groups have developed wellness programs. Examples are
educational programs to lose weight, to stop smoking, and to
exercise sensibly.
HMO's, common forms of prepaid health plans, are having
a substantial impact on U.S. health care. In 1970, there
were 33 HMO's in the United States serving approximately
Free-rider problems exist when someone gains from the
resource commitment of others without contributing
proportional resources to the effort.
three million enroilees (National Industry Council for HMO
Development, 1984). In 1983, there were 280 HMO's serving
12 million enroilees. HMO's have a market penetration of
33.7% in San Francisco, 26.4% in Minneapolis, 25.1% in Los
Angeles and 23.4% in Portland. Only one metropolitan area
with a population over one million is not served by an HMO.
Numerous studies confirm the lower cost of HMO's. Most
cost savings relate to total health care expenditures,
hospital admissions, and hospital length of stay (Luft and
Trauner, 1981). Luft (1980) found total hospital days per
1,000 enroilees to be 35% lower for HMO than fee-for-service
patients. Most of these reductions are due to reduced
hospital admission rates. Hospital admission rates were
found to be 20-40% lower for HMO enroilees (Luft, 1930), but
length of stay was not found to be perceptively lower (Luft,
1980)
,
(Arr.culd, DeBrock and Pollard, 198 4) . In another
experiment in which self-selection was carefully controlled,
researchers found that admission rates of HMO enroilees were
46% lower than fee-for-service patients. Some evidence
indicates that HMO's devote more attention to preventive
care. However, this incentive may be explained because
HMO's cover preventive care whereas most fee-for-service
clans do nor., resulting in a real price change for HMO
enroilees (Berki, et al 1977). Finally, Arnouid, DeBrock
and Pollard (1984) found that HMO's produce specific
services more efficiently.
For a detailed summary, see Luft (1981).
Looking at four surgical procedures, they found laboratory
and radiology charges to be 31-47% lower for EIMO patients
for two procedures and gross charges to be 35% lower for one
procedure. In no procedure was the charge higher.
Richardson, Martin and Diehr (1984) conducted a comparative
analysis of a staff plan and an IPA to determine if
free-riders and utilization review problems are more
difficult to control in IPA's. They found total costs,
hospital admissions, and average lengths of stay adjusted
per number of enrollees to be significantly lower for staff
plans than for IPA's.
Clearly integration cf the insurance and provider
functions change provider behavior and reduces transaction
costs resulting in significant gains in efficiency. One
caveat: is necessary. The HMO's included in the empirical
evidence vary in degrees of integration. In some,
integration is limited to third party payors and level one
physicians; in others, integration encompasses all levels of
providers. Thus, some cost reductions may be the result of
integration among first, second and third level providers.
Empirical evidence of gains in efficiency from integration
among providers in these levels is not available.
Horizontal and vertical integration among first and
second level physicians . The number of physicians organized
into group practices in the United States has grown. In
1980, 26.2% of the physicians were in 10,762 group
practices. The average group practice consisted of eight
physicians. By 1984, 29.3% of the physicians were in 15,485
groups . The average group practice consisted of nine
physicians. Seme groups consist of level one physicians;
others combine Levels one and two providers. Gains in
efficiency may result from economies of scale, reduced
contractual costs and information economies. Economies of
scale may result from the horizontal growth at various
levels of the system. For example, if providers own a
prepaid plan, economies of scale in the insurance function
may dictate the size of the patient base and, therefore, the
group practice necessary for the insurance function to
operate efficiently. Economies of scale in the prevision of
insurance is well documented (Arrow, 1963).
Forming group practices reduces the number of contracts
negotiated between providers; it also provides access to
internal mechanisms to control quality and costs. Group
practices may need to expand into other geographic markets
to attract an adequate patient base that will support; an
efficient insurance function. Contracting with independent
providers in various locations presents problems in quality
and utilization control similar to these attributed to IPA's
and non-integrated plans. To overcome these problems,
providers are diversifying into new geographic markets.
Kaiser-Permenente has physician staffs in 12 states and
Information provided to authors by Medical Group
Management Association.
hospitals in 22 cities. Level two physician centers are
establishing satellite level one provider facilities to
guarantee adequate patient base and to support the level two
care center efficiently. Mayo Clinic, a level two physician
group practice, has announced plans to develop satellite
facilities in southern states. Carle Clinic, also a level
two physician group practice, has satellites in a 50-mile
radius of its tertiary care center and plans further
geographic expansion.
Finally, information economies may be gained through
group practices if the practice provides a common level and
quality of information between level one and level two
physicians
.
^Integration between level two and level three
providers. This integration cermits input factors to
rearrange functionally and to respond mere readily to the
level of care required and the most cost effective means for
its provision. The flow of patients from hospitals, nursing
homes and home care services is not impeded in the short run
by economic constraints and by each input provider's need to
profit maximize if these facilities are vertically
integrated. The relationship between acute care hospitals
and skilled nursing facilities (SNF) has generally been on a
referral basis. Hospitals had no incentive with
retrospective fee-for-service reimbursement to transfer
patients needing only limited care from the hospital to the
SNF. In fact, with no restrictions on length of stay, the
hospital's incentive was to do the opposite. Hospitals
reimbursed on capitation and payment per DRG can lower costs
by reducing the hospital length of stay. Those patients
continuing to need care can be transferred to a SNF where
costs per diem average S46.00 in the United States compared
with $368.01 for acute care hospitals. Patients needing
lower levels of care than that provided by SNF ' s may be
transferred to their homes and treated by home care agencies
at even lower per diem costs.
All three provider groups exist in a variety of
relations with each other. All exist as freestanding units.
Nursing homes are owned by over 5 0% of the multi-hospital
systems, and over 40% have home care agencies. In seme
cases, SNF 1 s own home care agencies (Ermann and Gabei,
1984) . In fact, 84% of the nation's home care agencies are
owned by organizations other than freestanding visiting
nurse associations, usually hospitals or SNF ' s (Lundberg,
1984). Clearly, these services could remain freestanding
with patients attracted to them by referrals from
physician-agents. This relationship may not provide
unnecessary economic ties between the provider groups to
promote efficiency.
Management service contracts are being used to
establish contractual relationships between these providers
in many cases. Other providers are finding a number of
advantages from full integration into these areas. SNF '
s
require long-term investments in capital facilities. It is
difficult for health care providers to develop satisfactory
long-term contracts because they operate in an environment
of rapid technological change where quality standards are
difficult to establish and coordination is essential for
cost efficiency. Profits or surpluses will be captured by
the integrated system regardless of where the service is
provided within the system. Thus, there are more incentives
to provide the most appropriate care to meet patient needs
in the integrated system than in a non-integrated system.
The contractual completeness in an integrated approach
allows short-range efficiencies to accrue while the larger
"system" attends to the longitudinal need for overall
economic efficiency. In addition, greater flexibility
exists in meeting external competitive pricing. The
internal system has the ability to alter payment structures
on a dynamic basis to meet market demand and r.o deter market
entry (Schmalensee , 1973) . Thus, temporal market and
pricing varities can be effectively addressed without harm
to the overall system. This ability is important to second
and third level provider roles, which tend to be more
capital intensive.
The creation of information sharing and processing
systems is an essential element in the continued viability
of integrated relationships. Data processing systems with
high fixed costs can be expanded to encompass the
information needs of each provider level at a relatively low
marginal cost and with internal quality controls. More
complete information on operating costs allows the most
prudent use and arrangement of inputs. Demand forecasting
and modeling over a greater number of production units and
inputs are facilitated and improve the overall
predictability for services needed and resources required.
Savings can occur through inventory control, variable
staffing patterns and human capital transferability.
The common data base applied directly to patient care
provides the physician agent with more integrated input
information, which may have a positive impact on reducing
duplicated services. The date base serves both as a source
of quality control and peer evaluation and as a research
base to track the efficiency of various inputs,
configurations, and the quality of the results. Perhaps
most, importantly, an integrated system of financial and
clinical data can be used to effect change. Objective data
can be used by providers at ail levels tc evaluate the cause
and effect of various resource consumption decisions. The
data can assist in their decision making and balancing the
interests of the individual patient and the economic
interests of the system.
Quality of care may be enhanced through standardizing
the procedures, training and equipment used among integrated
providers. Standardization may also reduce input costs by
increasing purchasing power. The ability for the patient to
"transfer" information and procedures from the physician's
office, hospital, nursing home and home may be a significant
factor in. increasing patient compliance with prescribed
interventions. Greater compliance may lead to greater
clinical efficacy, thereby reducing overall resource
consumption.
Integrated providers may be able to hire and retain
more capable functional specialists through the ability to
spread their knowledge and costs over a larger number of
units. The improved forecasting capability of the system
v/ill expand the ability to plan the human resources needed
and to develop methods for their recruitment and training.
The health care industry's needs for human capital are
growing both in the numbers and the skills required. An
integrated system has the added potential to stimulate
individual and system growth through the interaction of
managers and providers at various levels. The structure of
the interaction within an integrated system tends to promote
more focused problem solving and a need to understand the
point of view of different provider levels. The integrated
system provides a built-in mechanism for individuals to
change their "perceptual set" on how things can be dene and
begins to expand understanding on a system level.
Technical efficiencies may be gained through the
availability of complimentary technologies. The
juxtaposition of various imaging approaches such as
computerized axial tomography (CAT) scanning and magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) allows their utilization on a timely
basis. Integration permits the diagnostic process to be
done relatively at the same time as other procedures are
conducted. Additional expensive hospital days can be
avoided and patient inconvenience minimized.
Integration can insure referrals within the various
sub-parts and allows priorities to be established. The
assured access to regulated production inputs (nursing home
ownership under Certificate of Need) is essential in
priority setting and may avoid monopoly pricing (Vernon and
Graham, 1971) . The aggregation of similar inputs throughout
the system may allow CON volume thresholds to be reached to
gain access to or expand regulated activities. Specific
exceptions such as HMO volume may also accrue to other
system inputs. Lastly, the ability of an integrated system
to move inputs from regulated to non-regulated provider
levels (hospital services to physician offices) represents
potential marker and financial advantages.
Providers, mainly physician groups and hospitals, have
integrated into various types of self-insurance. Typically,
this self-insurance includes self-insurance of malpractice
claims and employees* health care needs. Self-insurance
against workmens ' compensation has been practiced by many
firms for several years. There are four ways in which
self-insurance may result in lower costs. First, the cost
of a malpractice liability will detract from the ability of
the group practice or hospital to pay employees or engage in
other necessary activities. This cosr increases the
incentives for the organization to develop stringent quality
controls. Peer pressure from those affected financially by
the actions of individuals also will have an impact on
quality control. Second, insurance fees are determined by
group rating organizations. Organizations with better than
average risk experiences subsidize those with worse than
average experiences. Therefore, the former organizations
can reduce insurance costs by self-insurance. Third,
certain organizations may believe that their exposure to
risk is less than it is perceived to be by the insurance
market. This divergence of expectations may be due to
straight forward differences in interpretation, to quality
controls or to other limits on expcsure the benefits of
which cannot easily be conveyed to the private insurer.
Again, if the hospitals' or group practices' interpretations
of the information is correct, insurance costs will be
reduced by vertical integration. Fourth, truly integrated
insurance coverage may provide economies in combined legal
representation. United insurance obviates the ability of
the plaintiff's attorney to seek individual settlements and
thereby increase the total settlement. The economic savings
are difficult to project, but may be significant for cases
involving large and complex litigation.
Finally, all these forms of integration have a common
direction in the sense that the integration is encompassing
those provider services being prescribed by a prescribing
agent. In the traditional non-integrated system in the
United States, the primary care physician served this agency
role. That agency role has been lessened by utilization
review procedures enacted by ether provider groups and by
integrated systems in which an agent for the system looks
over the shoulder of all provider types. This
diversification also changes incentives of the different
provider groups and captures clients of one provider for all
elements of the system.
SUMMARY
Vertical integration has the potential to increase the
efficiency of health care provision significantly. We have
discussed types of integration that could increase technical
efficiency, reduce contractual, information and transaction
costs, and provide appropriate provider incentives. Most
potential sources of cost savings can be found in planned
economies as well as decentralized economies such as the
United States. In fact, a centralized function in the
United States, the methods used by the government as a
monopsonistic purchaser of health care services, created
many of the problems that retarded growth of integrated
systems
.
Vertical integration to provide more efficient
production of health care services and coordination of
patient needs is a relatively recent phenomenon in the
United States. Therefore, we could provide only limited
empirical evidence of its effects on health care costs.
Those cost savings are substantial in some areas. The
integration of the patient insurance function into the
provider functions is a case in point. The integration of
hospitals, SNF * s and home care agencies also provides a
strong potential for large cost reductions due to the
differences in daily costs among these units. However, no
estimates are available of the potential reductions in
lengths of stay at the higher cost facilities.
Although the forms of vertical integration discussed in
this paper are occurring at a rapid pace and some evidence
was provided of benefits from seme forms of integration,
there is contrary evidence within the same decentralized
economic markets of the United States. For example,
freestanding outpatient surgery centers and facilities which
treat only obstetric and gynecologic cases are being
constructed in many cities. Generally, this ccuntermovement
is occurring in localities where insufficient and/or
inefficient facilities exist. However, even though more
empirical evidence is necessary before passing final
judgment on efficiency comparisons, most existing evidence
suggests that some types of integration promote efficient,
high quality patient care. The sources of other types of
integration are dependent upon individual market conditions
and characteristics of the vertical linkages yet to be
discovered
.
TABLE
Percentage of Multihospital Systems Operating Health and Nonhealth Lines of
Business, 1982
Percentage of Multihospital Systems
Operating Health and Nonhealth
Line of Business Lines of Business, 1982
Health Care Services
L. Health promotion programs 55.7%
2. Ambulatory care facilities 55 .
1
3. Nursing homes 50.6
4. Hospices 34.8
5. Alcoholism or drug treatment centers 33.8
6. Surgery centers 22.2
7. Ambulance companies 20.3
P. Convenience medical centers 18.4
9. HMO/IPA 12.6
10. Preferred provider organizations 1 1 . '-
Administrative Health Care Services
1
.
Physician office buildings
2. Group purchasing plans
3. Health care management consulting
-. Department, management
71, 0"?
57, r
43,.0
26, , 6
^health Care Businesses
1. Office building management 23.4%
2. Real estate development 21.6
:. Retirement settlements 14.6
4. Warehousing 1 3 . _ ;
5. Insurance company management 12.6
6. Hotel/restaurant /resort management 4. 5
Source: American Hospital Association Survey or Multi-Hospital Systems
Executive Summarv 1983.
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